The politics of pipelines

Some 10 years ago, the federal cabinet was examining the possibility of selling surplus power to India. Today, thanks to the Musharraf regime’s criminal neglect of this sector, we are facing a crippling power shortage.

Islamabad has little to show for its efforts to secure energy sources over the years, apart from signing numerous memorandums of understanding.
As far back as 1993, an MOU was signed to construct the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project that India later wanted to join. It envisaged a 2,670km land pipeline with a 3,620 mmcfd gas transmission capacity.

A year later, an MoU was signed to bring gas from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan. In 2002 an agreement envisaging a pipeline over 1,271km up to Multan was also signed. It enjoyed US support, but continuing turmoil in Afghanistan, coupled with Turkmenistan’s inability to provide convincing proof of its gas reserves, is preventing progress. Then there is the Qatar-Pakistan pipeline under consideration since April 1992.

Many experts are convinced that it is only the IPI project that is technically viable and economically attractive. But US opposition has prevented any concrete movement on it. In the past year or so, India has lost some of its ardour for it, partly because of the US civilian nuclear deal and partly because of the high price demanded by Iran.
The Pakistani leadership claims to be committed to it, pointing to the presence of Presidents Zardari and Ahmadinejad at the signing ceremony of the gas sale agreement earlier on.

However, a recent controversy is causing concern. The petroleum adviser has resigned a couple of weeks after his startling disclosure that two countries, one western and the other in the Middle East, were applying pressure on Pakistan to abandon the project.

This had come as a rude shock to those who were reminded that the Indian petroleum minister Mani Shankar Aiyar had been eased out soon after his public defence of the project. No less significant was a news report that the country’s premier intelligence agency had expressed its reservations with the project, suggesting that Pakistan look for other options. Now we hear that the entire issue may be placed before parliament where it could be lost in debate for years.

Have we succumbed to external pressure and abandoned the only ‘doable gas pipeline project? The nation deserves to know. In the meanwhile, the world’s major powers are engaged in a frantic search to secure assured sources of energy by building transmission lines to move gas from the energy-rich Gulf and Central Asia to energy-starved Europe.

The latest to be launched is the Nabucco project, for which many of Europe’s statesmen gathered in Ankara last month. They were joined by US special envoy on Eurasian energy issues, Richard Morningstar, who some 10 years earlier had been instrumental in getting everyone on board the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline project despite Russia’s opposition.

The 3,300km Nabucco project, signed by Turkey, Austria, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, is estimated to cost $11bn and is projected to transport Central Asian gas bypassing Russia, going via Turkey to Austria and Germany through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. With four entry points into Turkey, it will ultimately tap gas from diverse sources and pump enough gas to meet five to 10 per cent of the European Union’s needs.

However, it is Iran’s involvement that makes the Nabucco pipeline so intriguing, for it will make it the transit corridor for Turkmenistan gas that will eventually go into the pipeline. For this, Iran has entered into an arrangement with Turkmenistan, with the two agreeing that instead of constructing a pipeline from Turkmenistan along the bottom of the Caspian Sea, they would transport Turkmen gas to Europe via existing pipelines to Turkey.

This means that Tehran has decided that while Washington explores how to rebuild relations with it, it can forge a strategic partnership with Europe, a view confirmed by the Turkish energy minister.

The Nabucco project represents a setback for Russia, as it will enable Europe to diversify its energy supplies. This explains why it had been promoting the South Stream project as an alternative to Nabucco, persuading the Balkan and Central European countries to opt for it. It may also mean that Turkmenistan is moving away from Russia and getting closer to the US, which could transform the Caspian energy sweepstakes.

With Russian gas supplies dwindling and surplus for export shrinking, Gazprom is even more dependent on Turkmenistan which currently produces 80,000mmcfd annually out of which most is sold to Russia. However, in recent months, supplies to Russia have been cut back sharply, because of an explosion on the Soviet-era Central Asia-Centre pipeline.

In the meanwhile, Turkmenistan has also agreed to increase its contracted gas supplies to China via a pipeline nearing completion. In addition, Turkmenistan has agreed to step up gas supplies for the Nabucco pipeline, which means that Turkmenistan intends to reduce its dependence on Russia. This could encourage other Central Asian energy producers to move away from Russia and opt for European markets through pipelines not going through Russian territory.

This means that Turkey is fast becoming the ideal transit country to carry non-Russian gas from Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to Europe, thereby assuming the role of an energy hub for Europe. But Turkey is careful not to antagonise Russia, a neighbour, top trading partner and main gas supplier.

Turkey is already linked directly to Russia through the Blue Stream gas pipeline, which runs under the Black Sea. Hoping to attract Russia and Kazakh oil, Ankara is promoting a pipeline from its Black Sea port of Samsun to Ceyhan on the Mediterranean coast, which already serves us a terminal for conduits pumping oil from Azerbaijan via Iraq.
While the world’s powerful states are scrambling to acquire secure sources of energy, we have failed to move on even one pipeline project, which only shows how oblivious our leadership has been to the country’s increasingly desperate need for energy.

EU and Pakistan

President Asif Ali Zardari’s summit meeting with the EU’s current presidency is expected to open a new chapter in Pakistan’s relations with Europe.

The statement issued after the summit in Brussels spoke of kick-starting a strategic dialogue covering security, aid, trade and measures to promote democracy. This is most encouraging. As Mr Javier Solana, the EU’s high representative for the 27-member bloc’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, wrote in this newspaper, a secure and stable Pakistan is essential for the people of Europe.

Therefore the EU perceives Pakistan’s war against terrorism to be a joint endeavour. This will be widely welcomed because Islamabad is well aware that its fight against the Taliban cannot be undertaken single-handedly, given its limited resources. In this context, the EU’s offer to help Pakistani police in their fight against militancy should be of enormous practical value since this is an area where Pakistan is on weak ground. Similarly, the EU’s offer of 72m euros as humanitarian aid for the IDPs should boost Islamabad’s relief and rehabilitation efforts for the war-affected people.

The summit in Brussels also signals the broadening of relations between the EU and Pakistan. As Mr Solana observed, this relationship that was mainly about trade has moved towards a strategically focused partnership. This is not simply because of Pakistan’s changed circumstances. The EU has also developed from a regional grouping for economic cooperation into a major political entity under the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997. But this should not detract from the EU’s role as a global economic power and how it can use this potential for promoting peace.

Thus the EU is Pakistan’s major trading partner which accounted for 20 per cent of its trade in 2007 when it imported 3.8bn euros worth of Pakistani goods. Yet at Wednesday’s summit some Europeans concerned about their own industries resisted moves to offer tariff concessions to Pakistan as an incentive to stimulate its economy. In the end, all it received was a vague offer of a free-trade agreement some time in the future. It is time the industrialised world understood that Third World countries can benefit more from trade incentives rather than having aid poured into their coffers.

Bangladesh urges Pakistan apology for 1971 ‘crimes’

Bangladesh's Foreign Minister Dipu Moni speaking at a news conference in Dhaka. –Reuters Photo

World

Man investigated in Kenya over Yugoslav war crimes

DHAKA: Bangladesh on Wednesday urged Pakistan to apologise formally for alleged atrocities committed by its army during Bangladesh’s bloody liberation struggle in 1971.

Bangladeshi officials have said three million people were killed during the fight for independence for what was then East Pakistan, and the new government in Dhaka has vowed to try suspected war criminals.

In a meeting with Pakistan’s High Commissioner on Wednesday, Foreign Minister Dipu Moni raised the issue of ‘seeking formal apologies by Pakistan for the genocide in 1971,’ a written statement said.

A Pakistani envoy told Bangladesh in February to let ‘bygones be bygones’ and rejected plans to try those accused of murder, rape and arson.

A private Dhaka-based group that has investigated the conflict has named 1,775 people, including Pakistani generals and local militants allied with Pakistan, as war crime suspects.

PAKISTAN is not a failed state

WASHINGTON: The United States on Tuesday quashed all speculations of a military takeover in Pakistan, saying that it would be terrible if it happened and Washington would oppose it strongly.

US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke touched on a number of sensitive issues in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

He revealed that Pakistan had used F-16s for bombing extremist targets in Bajaur and Swat.

He opposed linking US aid to allowing access to Dr A.Q. Khan and indicated that the US might be working on a programme with Pakistan to block FM radio broadcasts by pro-Taliban clerics.

‘Our goal must be unambiguously to support and help stabilise a democratic Pakistan headed by its elected president, Asif Ali Zardari,’ Richard Holbrooke, the US special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, told Congress.

‘We have the highest strategic interests in supporting this government,’ he said.

Asked how Washington would react if the military toppled an elected government in Pakistan, Mr Holbrooke said: ‘We are strongly opposed to that … it will be terrible.’

Mr Holbrooke also used his testimony to convey a message of support for Pakistan, its government and the military.

‘Pakistan’s of such immense importance to the United States, strategically and politically,’ he said. ‘We do not think Pakistan is a failed state.’

The US envoy insisted it was important for the US lawmakers also to understand that while Pakistan was under ‘tremendous social, political and economic stress’, it was wrong to describe it as a failed state.

A.Q. KHAN ISSUE
Even on the issue of nuclear proliferation, which evokes an emotional outburst from ordinary US citizens as well, Mr Holbrooke refused to browbeat Pakistan.

When a lawmaker suggested that the US aid to Pakistan should be linked to allowing American lawmakers to question Dr Khan, Mr Holbrooke said it would be a mistake to do so.

He said that this issue should have been tackled by the Bush administration and that the Obama administration would do all it could to prevent Dr Khan and others from spreading nuclear technology.

‘I have raised this issue with the government of Pakistan and they told me that it happened during the previous government,’ he said.

Mr Holbrooke said that while he supported seeking further assurances from Pakistan on this issue, ‘linking it to US aid will not help’.

The US envoy rejected the suggestion that the Obama administration was seeking a deal with Mr Zardari’s political rival, Nawaz Sharif and that’s why it had established regular contacts with the PML-N leader.

‘It is not true,’ he said. ‘Why we have contacted him? We have similar relations with other politicians as well. We do have a relationship with the opposition leader in Britain too.’

FM TRANSMISSIONS
The US envoy said he did not understand why the United States did not have a plan to block FM radio transmissions by pro-Taliban clerics in Swat.

Mr Holbrooke noted that the clerics used mobile FM units, mounted on motorbikes, for transmitting their messages and it should not be difficult to block such transmissions.

Mr Holbrooke said he had met President Zardari on Monday night and ‘immediately raised’ the issue of recent advances made by the militants in Swat and other places.

Mr Zardari, he said, reminded him that he had opposed the Swat deal but was forced to acquiesce. The events that unfolded during the past few weeks proved him write, Mr Holbrooke added.

The US envoy said that Pakistan had used F-16 aircraft against the militants in Bajaur and Swat but only during the daylight.

The US, he said, was now doing midlife upgrading of these F-16s and after the upgrading they could be used more effectively against the extremists.

Mr Holbrooke said that the DG ISI, who accompanied the presidential delegation to Washington, would stay in the US capital after the delegation left.

Karachi’s women: Persecuted or paranoid?

KARACHI: Farah, a 29-year-old who manages a courier service on Karachi’s Korangi Road, keeps herself covered in a white chador while driving through the city these days. ‘I’m not taking any chances if the Taliban are here,’ she says, covering up her usual attire of jeans and a short top.

In recent weeks, women in Karachi have become increasingly wary of the threat posed by militants from the northern areas who have allegedly infiltrated the port city. Reports that Taliban commanders have relocated to Karachi for fear of drone attacks in Quetta have coincided with a spate of incidents of female harassment. Although panic levels are high, women who have been targeted are reluctant to go public with their experiences. As a result, the city is rife with rumours, and people like Farah are living in fear, but no official action to investigate who is threatening women is being taken.

State of fear

In the past few weeks, upper- and middle-class women have been approached by men, bearded and otherwise, and warned not to leave the house without covering themselves from head to toe. In some cases, the harassers have been armed. In others, they have threatened women with physical attacks in the future if they do not change their ways. Another form of harassment entails the families of young women receiving letters on behalf of the Taliban. In the letters, fathers are told that they must reign in their daughters who are accused of roaming freely and wearing western outfits. Some businessmen have even been asked to make ‘donations’ to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in order to secure their daughters’ safety.

Despite the widespread panic that news of these threats has provoked, few women are willing to go on the record or register an official complaint. As a result, the extent of the threat posed to Karachi’s young women remains unclear.

For example, a fashion designer who initially claimed in public that her clients had received letters critiquing their mode of dress and ‘warning them to cover up, or else,’ refused to confirm details when speaking to the press. Similarly, a woman who was reportedly told by her fruit seller not to return to his stall if she wasn’t ‘properly attired’ refused to discuss the incident with this correspondent.

This is not to say that women have not been targeted at all. Noor, a 19-year-old university student who asked that her last name be withheld for security reasons, confirms that she received a threat. ‘My friends and I were in a shop on Zamzama Boulevard when a bearded man entered. He told us to have sharam and only leave the house when covered from head to toe,’ she says.

Similarly, Wilma, an employee at a five-star hotel in the centre of the city, says she was shopping with some friends on Tariq Road when a man approached one of them and threatened to throw acid at her if she didn’t dress properly in the future. ‘Girls wearing capri pants are especially being targeted,’ she says.

Moreover, women’s rights activist Attiya Dawood says that she was walking with her daughters in Hilal Park, a walled-off park in Defence, when some young men began throwing eggs at them and yelling at women to go home and stay away from the park. ‘I can’t confirm who those men were,’ says Dawood, ‘but my brain went straight to the reports that Taliban militants or their sympathisers are trying to scare women out of public spaces.’

Unmasking the threat

Dawood is correct to admit that her thoughts went straight to the Taliban even though she cannot identify the men who threw eggs at her. The fact is, no clear proof is available to indicate who may be victimising Karachi’s women.

City government officials argue that the threats are part of the ‘Talibanisation’ of Karachi. ‘Ordinary people, mostly from the Pashto-speaking community, feel empowered by recent successes [such as the passage of the Nizam-i-Adl Regulation] in the northern areas and feel they have a license to approach Karachi’s public,’ says Naib Nazim Nasrin Jalil.

But there are many who are sceptical, pointing out that there is no clear indication that men who have approached women are affiliated with or sympathetic to Taliban militants. Irfan Bahadur, the district superintendent of Sohrab Goth, says that ‘militant-like’ activity has not been detected in the locality that many believe is housing Taliban foot soldiers who have come to Karachi seeking shelter. ‘Many rumours have been spread to cause fear and it’s difficult to keep track of what's true and what’s not,’ he says.

Specifically with regard to the issue of women being targeted, Bahadur points out that gossip seems to be outnumbering the facts. Recently, it was rumoured that pamphlets had been distributed around Sohrab Goth, urging women to stay at home and keep covered. ‘I have not seen such a pamphlet,’ says Bahadur, ‘and no one has taken the effort to show it to me.’ Indeed, members of various women’s rights groups confirm that they have not seen the flier.

Off the record

Owing to women’s reluctance to make official complaints or go on-the-record with their experience in the media, the city government and law-enforcing agencies have no basis on which to investigate the matter further. The identity of the perpetrators remains shrouded in mystery, and too many women are fearing the worst – an urban reign of the Taliban.

To address this problem and help quantify the extent of female harassment in Karachi, women’s rights groups are launching campaigns against what they describe as the ‘tribalisation’ of Pakistani cities. ‘We are trying to make women realize that they are victims of a criminal act and that they must speak up and take legal action if approached,’ explains Dr Kausar Saeed Khan of the Karachi-based Women’s Action Forum (WAF).

Meanwhile, Shama Askari, a member of Tehrik-e-Niswan, is organising a group to petition the Sindh governor to set up a helpline where women can report cases in which they are threatened on account of their behaviour or attire. While such an initiative would be welcome, it will not prove effective until Karachi’s women are willing to speak out against the forces that might be trying to oppress them.

Talibanisation & Musharraf

While most people rightly blame Ziaul Haq for the rise of religious extremism in Pakistan, Musharraf’s role in bringing about Talibanisation in the country has been greatly overlooked.

Three decades ago Zia Haq chose the Hezb-i-Islami leader, Gulbadin Hikmatyar, as his favoured successor to Soviet rule in Afghanistan. After Zia’s death, the security establishment disenchanted with Hikmatyar’s lack of success replaced him in 1994 with the recently discovered Taliban. The Taliban’s seizure of Kabul in 1996 provided a boost for Pakistan’s security establishment. It provided Pakistan a foothold in Afghanistan and much-desired strategic regional depth to counter India.

Following the 9/11 attack in the US by Al Qaeda which was being sheltered by the Taliban Musharraf was forced to disown the Taliban regime. However, within days he announced on TV ‘I have done everything for the … Taliban when the whole world was against them….We are trying our best to come out of this critical situation without any damage to Afghanistan and the Taliban.’

Shortly afterwards, when the Taliban were ousted by the US-led invasion, Musharraf allowed tens of thousands of Taliban to enter Pakistan’s tribal belt, believing that opposing them would sideline Pakistan from the regional power game in Afghanistan. What was not revealed then was that a large number of Al Qaeda militants had used this opportunity to stealthily move into Pakistan as well. However, fearing direct US intervention, Musharraf vocally denied their existence within Pakistan.

Perhaps he imagined that the extremists would remain quiescent in Pakistan’s mountainous borderlands, but this was not to be. The military dictator’s personal agenda soon came in the way: Having flouted the constitution by coup d’état, Musharraf, like previous military dictators, became desperate for legal protection. This legal cover could only be provided by a compliant parliament.

Misusing his powers as army chief, Musharraf used his agencies to ensure that the 2002 election was rigged in Sindh and Punjab against the PPP and PML-N. This led to a rise of a motley bunch of politicians under the façade of the PML-Q. However, real damage was done in the NWFP and Balochistan, where the security agencies ensured the success of the religio-political alliance of the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal. As part of an understanding, Fazlur Rehman ensured that the MMA’s newly elected members of parliament united with the PML-Q to pass the 17th Amendment, legitimising all Musharraf’s unconstitutional acts.

Perceiving the two popular political parties — the PPP and PML-N — as a threat to his power, Musharraf became an inadvertent hostage to the MMA’s blackmailing. His backtracking in 2006 on repealing the Hudood Ordinances was just one example. The seats MMA ‘won’ in the National Assembly gave it serious clout in national affairs. Worse was that it also dominated the NWFP and Balochistan governments. The MMA government of NWFP moved quickly to impose a Taliban-like agenda. In a short space of time, the MMA produced a fertile environment for the spread of religious militancy throughout the NWFP and parts of Balochistan.

While the Taliban were perceived as essential to future Afghan policy, similar leniency was also applied to militant groups habitually infiltrating the Kashmir ceasefire line. The post-9/11 international crackdown on terrorism had given Musharraf much cause for worry. Initially he went on the offensive, proclaiming these militants valiant freedom fighters — in other words ‘good jihadists’ vs Al Qaeda, the ‘bad jihadists’.

However, the international pressure became too much to bear. Consequently, many of these groups were officially banned by Islamabad, and thus were forced to go underground and operate under different names. It became a game of smoke and mirrors. Every now and then a militant leader would be placed under house arrest and then released a few days later. Militant groups would be officially condemned on television while their workers continued to collect donations under different guises. While the Musharraf regime kept up appearances with the West, it felt impelled to maintain a working relationship with the MMA for its political survival. It also continued its linkages with the numerous politico-religious militant groupings in pursuit of its strategy for Afghanistan and India.

The MMA’s policy of providing succour to religious militancy, combined with Musharraf’s strategy of benign indifference, at best, towards the Taliban and Kashmiri militants, led to a perfect jihadi storm. Provided freedom, the militant groups gained momentum and developed linkages with each other and in some cases with Al Qaeda itself.

Soon the Taliban, with its new allies, spread its tentacles from Waziristan to the rest of Fata and later to Swat and beyond. Moreover, some of the militant groupings active in Kashmir had by now joined up with these transnational jihadist forces. Talibanisation had begun in earnest.

The Taliban crisis is a direct result of Musharraf’s legacy. For self-preservation he deliberately weakened the secular political structure, replacing it with a political environment which proved extremely conducive for religio-political militant groups that now threaten the existence of Jinnah’s Pakistan — ironically created as a refuge for the subcontinent’s Muslims.

It is time for a rethink. In this post-Musharraf scenario one can appreciate our security establishment’s preoccupation with external threats; that is their job after all. Nonetheless, why relentlessly pursue a policy to defend Pakistan externally which may, in itself, ultimately lead to the country’s destruction from within? Yes, hostility from neighbouring countries is a disturbing reality. But need we continue with a bungled policy which has led to destruction from within and failure without; Afghanistan remains a troubled dream and Kashmir a hopeless mirage.

It is time for an open discourse between parliamentary leaders and the security establishment to find a better solution to our problems. The protection of Pakistan’s river resources from encroachment is of vital importance; the survival of millions depends upon these rivers. However, this begs the question: if Pakistan disappears under the onslaught of religiosity, what use will all this water be? So, no matter how serious the water issue may be, it should, along with Kashmir, yield to a more pressing concern.

Obviously today’s most burning issue is the Talibanisation of large swathes of our country from where it appears to be spreading day by day, night by night. There is little point in berating the culprit. Recently in a foreign interview Musharraf offered his presidential services to save Pakistan from ‘self-destruction’. He is obviously delusional.

And the solution? All civil society can do is raise its voice as loudly as possible; the best the parliamentarians can do is pass sensible legislation; and the best the government can do is issue prudent instructions (which may or may not be obeyed). In the end, the answer can only lie with the army. Let us hope it now fulfills its primary responsibility to the people of Pakistan.

Understanding Balochistan

As tensions flare in Balochistan and the government alleges foreign involvement in the nationalist movement there, Dawn.com talks to Sanaullah Baloch, the Central Secretary Information of the Balochistan National Party – Mengal.

Your name was placed on the Exit Control List (ECL) and your brothers were reportedly abducted by the agencies during the Musharraf government. Have you considered filing charges now that the judges have been reinstated?

My entire family, including my parents, was placed on the ECL. Our assets were frozen, my brother was abducted and kept in an illegal detention centre for six months, and I was physically attacked by Musharraf’s agents during a conference in London. My website and 36 other Baloch websites were blocked by Pakistan Telecommunications Authority.

As for filing charges, several Baloch political parties tried to file charges against Musharraf, but the country’s institutions lack the will or courage to accept our plea against him.

You advocate a non-violent, political struggle to accomplish BNP (Mengal)’s goals, but it was the Balochistan Liberation United Front that succeeded in pressurising Islamabad…

Unfortunately, our deaf regimes and policy makers are not used to logical arguments. They only understand the language of power, force, guns and canons. That is why several resistance movements in Pakistan have taken on an increasingly violent character. Unfortunately, this becomes the culture in states governed by dictatorial regimes.

However, I don’t think that the non-violent aspect of the Baloch struggle has been nonproductive. Our political struggle, media campaigns, diplomacy, extensive inquiries on Baloch deprivation and its expression has widened our support beyond Balochistan and Pakistan.

In that case, why did you resign from the Senate?

From 2002 to 2006, as an active member of the Senate, I did my best to highlight the Baloch people’s plight. I was elected by the people to protect their rights, but we could not stop Islamabad’s assault on Balochistan. We could not protect the innocent Baloch from disappearances, torture, displacement and we could not stop our resources’ unabated exploitation. That is why we decided to quit the parliament. It is better to be among the people and tell them the truth as opposed to giving them false hope.

You have previously said that the National Security Council (NSC) can ensure that Balochistan has greater autonomy over its resources. But you also emphasise on electoral politics. If the NSC is the deal-breaker, why bother with political deliberations?

Unfortunately, it is a reality in Pakistan that the corridors of power are outside the Parliament. The NSC is basically the visible face of the establishment that consists of civil-military elites. They approved the military operation against Balochistan and, without their consent, no political regime can undo their policy of continued suppression.

In Swat, the government has negotiated a deal with the Taliban. What message does this give to groups aspiring to a more autonomous Balochistan?

The establishment in Pakistan has always felt comfortable with religious groups as they do not challenge the centralised authority of the civil-military establishment. The demands of these groups are not political. They don’t demand economic parity. They demand centralised religious rule which is philosophically closer to the establishment’s version of totalitarianism.

Islamabad’s elite are stubborn against genuine Baloch demands: governing Balochistan, having ownership of resources, and control over provincial security.

Some people believe that Baloch nationalist groups are materially supported by India in its bid to destabilise the Pakistani federation. How do you respond to this allegation?

Unfortunately, this has been the culture in Pakistan that all legitimate political movements against injustice have been labeled as foreign machinations and leaders of those movements have been called traitors and agents. Even the credibility of the lawyers’ movement was questioned by the establishment. Human rights defenders have also been labeled foreign agents. These are old tactics that all despotic regimes use to undermine legitimate political movements.

The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has promised resolving the Balochistan issue and President Asif Zardari recently announced a Rs 46.6bn package for Balochistan. Can the government shift the current Balochistan policy?

I am not optimistic about the PPP’s Balochistan policy. Musharraf promised and even spent more money to expand Islamabad’s strategic control over Balochistan. He pumped billions and officially decentralised corruption at all levels in the province to buy artificial sympathy, but failed. Millions were spent on media campaigns to prove that the central government is spending billions to develop Balochistan, but years of defective policies have further deteriorated the masses’ lives. Poverty only increased in Balochistan during Musharraf’s rule. According to one study, rural poverty in Balochistan increased 15 percent between 1999 and 2005. The only ‘development’ Balochistan has witnessed during Musharraf’s rule is the 62 percent increase in police stations.

Meaningful development can only occur if there is political empowerment, adequate healthcare, educational and employment opportunities and peace. At this moment, there is no spending in these sectors.

You have listed eight confidence-building measures that the federation can adopt to ease political tensions with Balochistan. Have any been implemented?

No. Displaced people are still living in appalling conditions, disappearances are still occurring, the military operation has only intensified and more senior Baloch nationalists are being intimidated, harassed and killed.

In a more autonomous Balochistan, how might the life of an average Baloch improve?

Political and economic empowerment will bring positive social change. It is unfair to blame the Baloch or tribal system for illiteracy, violations of women’s rights and poverty. How can people benefit from the existing system when there are more soldiers than teachers, more military cantonments and naval bases than universities and colleges, more police stations than vocational training centres?

In December 2008, a group in Quetta circulated pamphlets directing women to observe purdah. How will the BNP-M ensure security and respect for women?

We condemn all kinds of discrimination against women. Historically, Baloch society has been liberal when compared to other groups settled in and around the region. We have maintained a moderate identity since 1920 and have never used religious slogans to gain public support. However, the establishment has used religious groups to change Balochistan’s social fabric. There is no restriction and control on the Taliban in Balochistan, but agencies continue to intimidate Baloch nationalists.

Some analysts say that Baloch groups have been inconsistent in their struggle…

I can call it a gap or a pause rather than inconsistency. There has been suspension in the movement for many reasons. But as compared to other nationalist movements the Baloch struggle is surviving after continuous state suppression. Moreover, there are forged nationalist groups that have recently been created by the agencies to continue their policy of dividing and ruling.

Instead of always blaming Islamabad, why don’t Baloch leaders claim some responsibility for the current state of Balochistan?

There has been no fair opportunity for Baloch nationalists to govern Balochistan. The first Baloch government headed by Sardar Ataullah Mengal was toppled in 1973 just before completing nine months. The second coalition government of Nawab Bugti worked for 18 months. The third, of Akhtar Mengal, was removed after 14 months. Not a single Baloch government was allowed to continue for a complete parliamentary period. That is why we hold Islamabad responsible for the Baloch people’s plight. Without giving authority to genuine Baloch leaders, we cannot blame them for the appalling state of affairs in the region.