Counter-terrorism in cities

On the front line of the battle against militancy in Pakistan’s cities are the country’s policemen. But, beset by problems of poor training, inadequate resources and low morale, the police have been pummelled by the terrorists, and urban Pakistan has become exponentially more dangerous over the past few years. Now, the federal government has decided to form a special anti-terrorism force to curb terrorism and suicide bombings that have rocked Pakistan’s cities and towns. But will the plan work? Not without a proper assessment of what ails the police force.

Early on in Gen Musharraf’s regime police reform became a mantra, and the push for change culminated in the Police Order 2002. Reform was proposed in four key areas: the police had to be thoroughly depoliticised; it needed full autonomy; strict, external accountability was required; and the resources at the disposal of the police had to be beefed up. Unsurprisingly, the Musharraf regime got cold feet and by 2004 changes to the Police Order had killed off any chance of genuine reform. More resources were admittedly thrown at the police, but the core problem remained: the age-old executive practice of using the police to quell political opposition continued unchecked.

On the terrorism front, a report by the International Crisis Group last July found it ‘hardly surprising’ than an ‘under-staffed, ill-equipped, deeply politicised, and pervasively corrupt (police) force has failed to counter the growing extremist menace’. Firstly, the police ranks have been penetrated by the very sectarian and jihadi groups they are tasked with containing. Secondly, poor coordination at the inter-agency level hampers effective counter-terrorism efforts. As the ICG noted: ‘In Punjab, for instance, the police maintain updated lists of sectarian activists with criminal records, but intelligence agencies only take action after a terror attack has occurred.’

In January, the government did set up the National Counter Terrorism Authority, tasked with coordinating intelligence among the FIA, IB, ISI, etc., and appointed a former DG of the FIA as the NCTA’s national coordinator. But a good idea on paper can only become a good idea in practice if the government shows real commitment to its success, and the requisite urgency has been missing in the case of the NCTA. Clearly, something radical needs to be done to ready our police force to take on the militants. But success will only come if the plans are drawn up and executed by professionals with minimal political interference.