Nizam-i-Adl regulation

Did the federal government do the right thing by placing the Nizam-i-Adl regulation before parliament for debate? We believe it did. With a matter as complex as Swat, there are inevitably many aspects to consider. Begin with the ANP.

The party threatened to pull out of the federal government if President Zardari did not sign the Nizam-i-Adl regulation immediately. But this was not the kind of politics the country needed. Granted the constitution gives the president the authority to make ‘regulations for the peace and good government of a Provincially Administered Tribal Area’, and the Sharia deal was struck on the understanding that the president was on board. But what the ANP and TNSM agreed to implement in the Malakand Division is no ordinary change — it effectively cedes judicial control of a part of Pakistan to a band of militants who have been waging a savage war against the state.

Surely the correct approach politically was to bring parliament into the loop on such a dramatic change to the state’s writ. However, President Zardari must shoulder some of the blame for the mess. If the pact with the TNSM was unacceptable, then why did the president originally give his approval, tacit or otherwise? And if parliament was the right forum to debate the issue, then why wait for two months to do so?

The fact is that both the ANP and the president painted themselves into corner over the Nizam-i-Adl. The ANP perhaps calculated that in caving in to the militants’ demand in Swat, the party would at least be able to govern the rest of the province and consolidate support among the electorate. Having relied on the president for backing, the ANP found itself in an awkward position vis-à-vis the militants to whom they promised much. As for President Zardari, he tried to appease all sides — an impossible contortion act always destined to leave both allies and enemies fuming.

The Nizam-i-Adl has been approved by parliament and promulgated by the president. But the debate in parliament was yet another missed opportunity. The bigger point is that the politicians still need to reach a consensus on how to counter militancy. When force is used some segments in the political spectrum erupt in anger and indignation. When peace deals are pursued, other segments denounce them as appeasement. Yet, no one seems serious about devising a credible strategy to fight militancy.

The time for platitudes has passed. If Swat and the Nizam-i-Adl were a test case, then the politicians have not done justice to finding that credible strategy. Already the militants have spread to Buner. Mardan and Swabi seem to be the next likely districts. Simply endorsing the Nizam-i-Adl in a bid to bring peace to the Malakand Division may be too little and have come too late.